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I. INTRODUCTION
To some fanfare, Riley v. California' announced the Fourth
Amendment 2 requirements for searching a cell phone found on a person
incident to that person's lawful arrest. The Supreme Court held that such a
search requires a warrant.' To reach this conclusion, the Court made two
decisions. The first was whether to deviate from the rule established in
United States v. Robinson,' which categorically allows the warrantless search
incident to arrest of the personal property "immediately associated with" the
arrestee.s Robinson specifically allows the thorough search of a container,

* Bernard D. Meltzer Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Arnold Loewy for
hosting this Symposium and including me. For very helpful comments on my presentation and earlier
drafts, I thank Orin Kerr, Andy Leipold, John Rappaport, Chris Slobogin, and Lior Strahilevitz. For
excellent research assistance, I thank Kayla Gamin, Reeves Jordan, and Ben Montague.
1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). The case combined Riley v. Calfornia and
UnitedStates v. Wurie. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2013).
2. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
4. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
5. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (distinguishing Robinson, and requiring a
warrant to search a footlocker when it was not "immediately associated with" the person of the arrestee),
limited by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
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and the first question in Riley was whether that rule applies when the
container was a cell phone.6
I have only a little to say about this aspect of Riley. Robinson had not
been uncontroversial, but for a long time, when applied to containers found
in the possession of a person being arrested, the loss of privacy from a search
was usually limited (given what people tended to carry on their person).' So
there was something to be said for relieving the police of the burden of getting
a warrant, given a valid arrest. Occasionally, people might possess
something particularly sensitive on their person-a diary or medical filebut no rule gets the tradeoff right in every case. Nonetheless, long after
Robinson, people started to carry cell phones. The pervasive use of cell
phones changes the tradeoff because a high percentage of Americans now
routinely possess a digital device that contains a huge volume of personal
data about their lives-messages, locations, photographs, internet search
history, personalized apps, etc. It is simply too much to give the police
warrantless access to 100% of that information based merely on probable
cause that a person has committed a crime, even the most trivial crimes, or
crimes for which there is no reason to expect the phone to contain evidence
of the crime.
So it was not entirely surprising that the Court decided unanimously that
Robinson does not apply to cell phone searches incident to arrest.8 The Court
gave various good legal and policy reasons for its decision.9 My only
comment here is to note one good reason the Court did not give. Given its
hostility to claims of pretext,' 0 the Court predictably chose not to mention
that if police expected to acquire a treasure trove of personal and historical
information by arresting an individual, because the arrest automatically made
the entire cell phone subject to search, they would have a powerful incentive
to make arrests for trivial crimes-of the sort they would not ordinarily
make-for no other purpose than to gain that evidence."

6. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484-85; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
7. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
8. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
9. Id. at 2485-91.
10. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080-83 (2011) (holding that an objectively
justified arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment just because it was a pretext for detaining the
citizen); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (holding that whether a traffic stop is consistent
with the Fourth Amendment does not depend on the officer's subjective motivations).
11. The problem is acute because in past decisions the Court has ruled that the Fourth Amendment
permits arrests for misdemeanors committed in the officer's presence, no matter how trivial the offense
and even if state law does not authorize the arrest for that offense. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164,
176 (2008) (holding that a warrantless arrest was constitutionally reasonable because the crime was
committed in the presence of an arresting officer, even if state law did not authorize the arrest); Atwater
v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) ("If an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may . . . arrest the
offender.").
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Yet my concern, and the sole focus of this Article, is the second decision
in Riley, less obvious but no less necessary to resolve the case. If Robinson
is not controlling, must the result be that a warrant (or other warrant
exception) is required for any cell phone search incident to arrest? The
United States argued for various "fallback options," in the event that
Robinson was not controlling.12 These options compromised between the
Robinson rule that requires no additional justification for the search given a
valid arrest and the general container rule that requires a warrant or other
warrant exception.1 3 If the chief concern in distinguishing Robinson is to
avoid the absurd result that a valid arrest gives the police everything on the
phone without any judicial oversight, no matter the nature of the offense, then
one might avoid that result while still giving the police power in some cases
to search some parts of the phone. The United States and California argued
in the alternative for various intermediate rules that would permit, but limit,
warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest.1 4 A crucial part of Chief
Justice Roberts' opinion in Riley is the section rejecting all of these
alternatives." In this Article, I examine the arguments for the compromise
of a "scope-limited" search of cell phones incident to arrest, as I will define.' 6
I proceed in three substantive parts. I begin by stepping back from the
particular context of cell phones and searches incident to arrest.' 7 The
decision of whether to recognize a scope-limited search incident to arrest is
part of a fundamental choice for Fourth Amendment law, which is whether
to recognize distinctions in the intensity of searches." As I explain in Part
II, the Court recognizes a distinct category of low-intensity, scope-limited
searches in several contexts, but rejects it in others. Riley is the latest
example of the latter. Given the case's high-profile significance for the
intersection of new technology with the Fourth Amendment, it may be easy
to overlook this other way that Riley matters to the fundamentals of the
doctrine.
In Part III, I define the particular scope-limited search of cell phone
searches incident to arrest that I will defend: the Court could have permitted
police to conduct a brief field search of a cell phone incident to arrest without
a warrant when there is reason to believe that the phone contains useful
evidence of the crime of arrest, and when the police limit their search to the
places where such evidence might realistically be found. In this Part, I
consider the Court's brief argument for rejecting any such compromise
solution.
12. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
13. Id at 2491-93; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), limited by California
v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
14. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491-93.
15. Id.
16.

See infra Part IV.

17.
18.

See infra Part II.
See infra Figure I.
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In Part IV, I make four arguments for the warrantless scope-limited
search. I do so while assuming, as the Court did, the basic framework of
relevant Fourth Amendment doctrine.' 9 First, even if one generally prefers
simple rules for searches incident to arrest, and therefore presumptively
prefers a single category of search, this context is one in which the stakes for
privacy and law enforcement are high enough to justify a more complex rule,
such as one that distinguishes between scope-limited and full-fledged
searches.20
Second, a scope-limited search would plausibly set the right balance
between law enforcement needs and the values of the Fourth Amendment.2 1
Limited cell phone searches incident to arrest may be an important
component of good investigative police work, when persistent promptness in
following up leads is valuable, even though the value of timeliness falls short
of that demanded by the exigent circumstances exception. Indeed, just a few
months after Riley, the Canadian Supreme Court authorized a kind of
scope-limited search of a cell phone incident to arrest based on just these
concerns.2 2 By contrast, the warrant requirement might actually produce cell
phone searches that are far more intrusive and destructive of privacy than
what a cursory field search would allow. 23

Third, Riley creates a doctrinal anomaly: the enormous gap between
searching private digital and private analogue data incident to arrest.2 4 As I
explain, the gap would be less incongruous if the Court allowed a warrantless,
scope-limited search of the cell phone. Indeed, the category of scope-limited
searches might facilitate greater Fourth Amendment protection of ordinary
analogue papers incident to arrest than currently exists.
Finally, the refusal to recognize a scope-limited search will put pressure
on lower courts to expand the exigent circumstances exception in order to
create an alternative path to quick and minor searches of phones.25 If so, the
broadening of exigent circumstances will have undesirable effects beyond the
search of cell phones incident to arrest, making it easier to justify the
warrantless search of homes.
In sum, although I fully agree with the Riley Court's decision to
distinguish Robinson, I argue that the Court erred in its unanimous decision
to reject all the Governments' compromise solutions. The Court should not
19. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482-83. Thus, I assume a warrant requirement is subject to numerous
exceptions. See id I do not consider general arguments against the warrant requirement or a general attack
on the search incident to arrest doctrine (that might, contrary to Robinson, demand a warrant to search any
container found on an arrestee once it is secured). See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234
(1973).
20. See infra Part IV.A.
21. See infra Part V.B.
22. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 627 (Can.).
23. See infra Part 11.
24. See infra Part IV.C.
25. See infra Part IV.D.
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have required a warrant or other warrant exception for any and all searches
of a cell phone incident to arrest.
II. How MANY KINDS OF SEARCHES ARE THERE?

To show how Riley fits into the broader framework of the Fourth
Amendment, I begin by identifying the subcategories of a search.26 By
subcategories, I distinguish the broader category of a search, which, for
understandable reasons, occupies the considerable attention of courts and
scholars.27 The line between a search and a non-search, like the line between
a seizure and a non-seizure, defines the threshold issue for the application of
the Fourth Amendment. 28 Yet, once the government activity is classified as
a search, important doctrinal distinctions remain within the category,
defining differences among searches.2 9 The relevant doctrine sometimes
refuses to recognize any difference among searches, concluding that "a
search is a search.""o In other cases, however, the doctrine distinguishes
between search types, each with a different requirement for making the
search reasonable. There are also parallel distinctions among types of
seizures, but they are less pertinent to Riley.3 1
When the police seek evidence of criminal wrongdoing, how many
types of searches are there? 32 The answer in the Fourth Amendment depends
26. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
27. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a "Search" Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70
ALB. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2006); see Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints ofa Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REv. 119, 122 (2002); Orin S. Kerr, The
Curious History ofFourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REv. 67, 68-69 (2013).
28. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987).
29. See Kerr, supra note 27, at 73-75.
30. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325.
31. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1968). Regarding seizures of persons, Terry v. Ohio
famously recognizes the lesser seizure of an investigative stop justified by reasonable suspicion,
distinguished from the greater seizure of an arrest, which is justified only by probable cause. Id. Of
practical significance, the concept of the low-intensity seizure applies to ordinary automobile stops. See
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (stating that "a routine traffic stop," which is
ordinarily relatively brief, "is 'more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop" . . . than to a formal arrest"'
(quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113,117 (1998)). The Fourth Amendment also recognizes a separate
category of high-intensity seizures of persons-those involving the use of deadly force, which require
heightened justification. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 6 (1985) (holding that the use of deadly
force to seize a fleeing felon violates the Fourth Amendment unless the felon has committed a violent
crime or poses an ongoing danger).
The Supreme Court has extended this distinction in the intensity of seizures to property, in which
the duration of detention can determine whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion is required. See
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705-06 (1983) ("Given ... that seizures of property can vary in
intrusiveness, some brief detentions of personal effects may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth
Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a seizure based only
on specific articulable facts that the property contains contraband or evidence of a crime.").
32. My focus on ordinary criminal wrongdoing excludes consideration of the "special needs"
doctrine, in which the Court steps outside the probable cause/warrant framework that governs Riley in
favor of a general balancing. See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference:
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on what is being searched. The Fourth Amendment lists four objects of a
search: persons, houses, papers, and effects. 33 Terry established that there is
more than one category of searches of persons.34 Terry created the new
category of a "frisk," the patting down of outer clothing in a search for
weapons." The doctrinal significance is that a full search requires probable
cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime,36 whereas, after a lawful
stop, the frisk requires only reasonable or articulable suspicion that the
suspect is armed.37 For our purposes, what matters is that there is more than
one type of search.
In fact, there are more than two. Some cases involve extraordinary
searches. For example, Lee v. Winston held that ordinary standards, such as
probable cause and a warrant, are not sufficient to justify a search that
involved surgery (requiring general anesthesia) to recover a bullet in the
suspect's shoulder, allegedly the same bullet the victim had justifiably fired
at the criminal perpetrator." The Court upheld an injunction against the
surgery, partly because other substantial evidence meant that the bullet was
not vital evidence for securing a conviction, a factor not ordinarily relevant
to the Fourth Amendment analysis.39 Again, for our purposes, what matters
is that there are (at least) three kinds of searches of persons in Fourth
Amendment law: a low-intensity frisk, a medium-intensity ordinary search,
and a high-intensity surgical intrusion.40
Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1223, 1228-30 (2004)
(detailing the special needs doctrine); Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen "Whilst He Is Quiet":
Suspicionless Searches, "Special Needs" and General Warrants, 74 Miss. L.J. 501, 546-47 (2004). For
the relationship between the doctrine and the administrative search doctrine, see Eve Brensike Primus,
DisentanglingAdministrative Searches, Ill COLUM. L. REV. 254, 276-77 (2011). For special needs, one
might say there are no finite number of searches because the court balances the law enforcement benefits
against the privacy (or other) costs of the specific search at issue. See Arcila, supra; Sundby, supra. Riley
deals with police searches to advance "the general interest in crime control," so I generally ignore special
needs in what follows (except in infra note 64). City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
33.

See supra note 2.

34.
35.
36.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
Id. at 8.
More precisely, the police officer needs probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a

felony or has committed a misdemeanor in the officer's presence. See, e.g., Atwater v. City ofLago Vista,

532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) ("If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed
even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may ...

arrest the offender."); United States v.

Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (discussing the common law rule that an "officer was permitted to
arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not
committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest").
37. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
38. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1985).
39. Id. at 765-66.
40. Another high-intensity search of a person is a strip search or body cavity search. Florence v. Bd.
of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1522-23 (2012). The Supreme Court recently
upheld strip searches of those entering the general jail population. Id. Yet, there is still a general
understanding that strip searches must be analyzed separately from an ordinary search of a person. See,
e.g., United States v. Husband, 226 F.3d 626, 634 (7th Cir. 2000) ("A compelled medical procedure,
coupled with an invasive search of a person's body cavity, is a significant intrusion upon an individual's
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When we move from persons to houses, papers, and effects, however, it
becomes more difficult to answer the question: How many search types are
there? Houses or real property start with entry. Entry into a home, or even
the curtilage around a home, requires probable cause and a warrant or warrant
41
exception. Yet, one could plausibly say that the doctrine recognizes two
degrees of entry. Ordinary home searches require that police "knock and
announce" their presence and pause for a brief time before entering.42 Yet,
police can avoid this requirement by a "no knock" warrant or exigency if
there is reasonable suspicion to believe the warning would prompt the
occupants to destroy evidence or prepare to attack police.4 3 An unwarned
entry is more intense and more threatening to privacy and security, so the
doctrine requires greater justification." Thus, we might say that the search
constituting a home entry has two levels: warned and unwarned.
After entry is effected, more than one kind of search exists inside the
home. An ordinary interior search requires probable cause and a warrant or
warrant exception.4 5 But there are lesser searches in the home, such as the
"protective sweep"-a quick search for people in the home, other than those
named in the warrant, who might be a threat to the officers.46 The issue arises
because the ordinary search has to end when the object of the search,
including a person to be arrested, is found; the ordinary search is also limited
to places where the items named in the warrant might be found.47
In Maryland v. Buie, however, the Court authorized searching beyond
these temporal and spatial limits, empowering police in every case to
examine immediately adjoining areas for hidden persons without any reason
to believe these adjoining areas actually contain such persons, much less that

dignitary and privacy interests and, whenever possible, should be preceded by a neutral evaluation of the
manner in which the search is to be executed.").

41.

See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that a non-trespassory use of a

thermal imager measuring only the heat emanating from a house was a house search requiring warrant);

Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) (overruling a prior decision upholding warrantless
administrative searches of homes); see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302-04 (1987)
(explaining a four-factor test for defining curtilage, the search of which requires a warrant).

42. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).
43. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 41-43 (2003) (holding that an interval of 15-20 seconds
after announcing and before entry was reasonable given the exigency of the possible destruction of

evidence); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (holding that it is not necessary to knock and
announce when officers "have a reasonable suspicion that [doing so], under the particular circumstances,
would be dangerous or futile, or ... would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example,
allowing the destruction of evidence"). Of course, all of this matters less because the exclusionary rule
does not apply to knock-and-announce violations. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 604-05 (2006).
44. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 393-95.
45. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) (rejecting a "murder scene exception" to the
warrant requirement for a home search).

46.

See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).

47.

See, e.g., id. at 332-33. If one were looking for a recently stolen car or other particularly large

items, then the search warrant would not authorize looking through closets, showers, stalls, or on upper
floors where they could not plausibly be located. See id
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they pose a danger.4 8 Second, Buie empowered officers to look anywhere
beyond the immediately adjoining areas if they have reasonable suspicion to
49
believe that a dangerous person is present and may pose a risk of attack.
The Court analogized the case to Terry and a subsequent case authorizing the
frisk of a car.so Like Terry, the protective sweep is more limited in scope
than an ordinary home search-applying to a narrower band of the home and
for a limited purpose that will exclude searching drawers, cabinets, and other
compartments too small for a person." Likewise, a protective sweep is
triggered by something less than probable cause (for adjoining spaces, by the
mere validity of the entry, and for further searches, by reasonable
suspicion).52 So there are at least two categories of searches of real
property."
With respect to personal property (papers and effects), we see a similar
dichotomy in one and only one instance: the automobile. An ordinary search
of an automobile is excused from the warrant requirement but requires
probable cause.54 Yet in Michigan v. Long, the Court recognized the
48. Id. at 334.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 332.
51. Id. at 327. One might object that protective sweeps are not a different category of search but
merely a standard search for something the size of a person. Yet there is something distinctive about Buie
searches. First, the normal principles would not allow the search; otherwise, there would be no need for
a special rule. Id. at 336. Second, the authorized search is intended to be scope-limited-a quick look in
separate rooms for a person. Id. That is why the court explicitly refers to the idea of a frisk, citing Terry.
Id. at 335-36 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)). The Court uses Terry because it wanted
to authorize only a low-intensity search. See id.
52. Id at 334.
53. Exactly how many more categories is a difficult issue. One might count Buie itself as creating
two non-ordinary search subcategories for the home: one for persons in spaces adjoining the location
where police find the object of the search, such as an arrestee (which requires no additional justification),
and another for non-adjoining spaces (which requires reasonable suspicion to believe a dangerous person
is present). See id. at 335-37. Thus, the total number of search types is arguably three. A case further
complicating the count is Chimel v. California, under which, if the arrest in the home is valid, the police
can, without further justification, search for evidence of a crime or weapons not only on the arrestee's
person, but also in "the area [of the home] 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
No Supreme Court case identifies a high-intensity search of real property, analogous to surgery on
a person, in which a warrant is insufficient. But one might imagine that the courts would create such a
category if the police wanted to do something highly destructive, such as dig up the foundations of a house
looking for a buried body. Some lower courts have. See, e.g., San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle
Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding unreasonable the police ripping
up a concrete slab containing gang-member signatures given the large amount of other gang indicia present
at the home in question); United States v. Martineau, No. 03-10298-NG, 2005 WL 5517798, at *12 (D.
Mass. Feb. 23, 2005) (finding that the removal of part of a wall was unreasonable, given the absence of
suspicion that the wall contained evidence of crime). But see United States v. Whisnant, 391 F. App'x
426, 430 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that cutting into wall was reasonable as part of a murder investigation
when the officer noticed a part of a wall appeared recently patched); United States v. Becker, 929 F.2d
442, 446-47 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the use of a jackhammer to search for evidence beneath a
concrete slab on the land behind defendant's home was reasonable).
54. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991).
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possibility that a valid Terry stop could permit a cursory search for weapons
in the car of the person stopped." In that case, the police approached an
individual outside his car, which was parked on the side of the road."6 The
car door was open and upon seeing the police, the suspect walked back to the
open door, and, from the outside, the police spotted a hunting knife in the
car.57 The Court, therefore, upheld a cursory sweep for weapons in the
passenger area of the car based on reasonable suspicion, not probable cause.ss
The Court saw the case as entirely about the scope of Terry to frisk the area
around the suspect in addition to the suspect. 9 An ordinary car search allows
the police to look anywhere in the car where they may find the evidence and
have probable cause to believe it is present in the car."o In Long, the police
acted on reasonable suspicion and "restricted" their search "to those areas to
which Long would generally have immediate control, and that could contain
a weapon."' Thus, the Terry search is more limited in scope and duration
than a car search justified by probable cause.62 As the Court later put it: "In
a sense, Long authorized a 'frisk' of an automobile for weapons." Thus,
there are at least two categories of a search of an automobile.
Beyond these cases-persons, real property, and automobiles-the
Supreme Court has never recognized a distinctive category of a low-intensity
or scope-limited search (although some lower courts have).64 To the
contrary, the Court emphatically rejected this category in Arizona v. Hicks. 5
There, the police entered an apartment based on exigent circumstances-the
recent firing of a weapon.66 The circumstances justified the police to look
55. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1983).
56. Id. at 1035-36.
57. Id
58. Id. at 1049.
59. See id at 1045-50.
60. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 568 (1991).
61. Long, 463 U.S. at 1050.
62. Compare id. (holding that the search during a Terry stop is limited to the area within the
immediate control of the defendant), with Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 568 (holding that if the officer has probable
cause to search a car, then the entire car may be searched).
63. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
64. In the Terry-search context, some courts uphold what is described as a frisk of a backpack or
purse as part of a frisk of a person for guns supported only by reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States
v. Hemandez-Mendez, 626 F.3d 203, 213 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Medina, 130 F. App'x 862,
863-64 (9th Cir. 2005). These cases do not actually hold that a greater search would violate the Fourth
Amendment, and other cases have rejected that idea. See United States v. Walker, 615 F.3d 728, 733-34
(6th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, Hernandez-Mendez and Medina recognize a conceptual distinction in
high- and low-intensity searches of personal effects. See Hernandez-Mendez, 626 F.3d at 213; Medina,
130 F. App'x at 863-64. Another example is the special needs context, which l am generally ignoring for
reasons explained in note 32, supra. In Mac Wade v. Kelly, the court upheld a program allowing the
inspection of bags for individuals entering the New York City subway. Mac Wade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260,
275 (2d Cir. 2006). Besides relying on the fact that the process was random and focused only on bags
large enough to contain explosives, the court also emphasized the cursory nature of the inspection: only a
quick look, lasting a few seconds, inside compartments big enough to hold explosives. Id. at 264-65.
65. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327-29 (1987).
66. Id. at 323-24.

106

TEXAS TECH LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 48:97

for a shooter or a weapon. 67 The Court held that police exceeded their
authority by picking up a stereo they suspected was stolen and turning it
around to read serial numbers otherwise blocked from view."8 Writing for
the Court, Justice Scalia stated that "[a] search is a search, even if it happens
to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable."69 He held that this
additional search required additional justification in the form of probable
cause to believe the stereo was stolen.70
In contrast, the Hicks dissent saw the case as the perfect vehicle to
recognize a scope-limited search doctrine for personal property other than
cars. 7 1 Justice O'Connor, writing for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice Powell, distinguished "a full-blown search" from "a cursory
inspection of an item in plain view," in which the former required probable
cause and the latter, only "reasonable, articulable suspicion."72
Characterizing the precedent of the time, she stated that "the overwhelming
majority of both state and federal courts have held that probable cause is not
required for a minimal inspection of an item in plain view."73 She found this
to be entirely consistent with the general tenets of the Fourth Amendment
doctrine: "We have long recognized that searches can vary in intrusiveness,
and that some brief searches 'may be so minimally intrusive . . . that strong

countervailing governmental interests will justify a [search] based only on
specific articulable facts' that the item in question is contraband or evidence
of a crime." 74 She concluded that "[t]he theoretical advantages of the 'search
is a search' approach . . . are simply too remote to justify the tangible and
severe damage it inflicts on legitimate and effective law enforcement.""
Figure 1 summarizes this tentative taxonomy, showing how the Fourth
Amendment doctrine does and does not distinguish between searches,
depending on the target of the search. Now we can see how Riley fits into
the overall picture. Riley offered another opportunity to recognize a category
of low-intensity searches of personal property. The Court could have held
that, incident to arrest of a person with a cell phone, the police may conduct
a cursory, "minimal inspection" of the phone, but that they would need a
warrant to proceed beyond this limited scope. Without either side referring
to Hicks, the Governments were arguing, as a fallback, for the position of the

67. Id. at 324-25.
68. Id. at 323-24.
69. Id. at 325.
70. Id. at 326-27.
71. See id. at 338-39 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
72. Id at 333, 335.
73. Id. at 336.
74. Id. at 337 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983)). Justice Powell, writing
for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor made similar points, distinguishing the
movement of the stereo from a "general exploratory search." Id. at 331 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 339 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Hicks dissent, and the Court unanimously favored the position of the Hicks
majority. 76
SEARCH INTENSITY
SEARCH TARGET:

LOW

ORDINARY

PERSONS

Frisk (Terry)

Search

HIGH

Surgery
(Winston)

REAL PROPERTY

None?

Protective Sweep
(Buie)

Search

None (Hicks)

Search

None

Protective Sweep
(Long)
None (Riley)

Search

None?

PERSONAL PROPERTY

Generally
But Automobiles?
But Cell phones?

Search

[

None

FIGURE In
As a small digression from the focus on Riley, consider that Figure 1
might include more cases in it if I included not only cases that are explicitly
about the number of search subcategories, but also cases that might be
reinterpreted to include this concern. One example is United States v. Jones,
a case heavily discussed at the Symposium." In Jones, Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Kagan joined Justice Alito's concurring opinion, which stated
that the monitoring of an individual's public movements, including using a
76.

See id at 336. The comparison does not mean that Hicks could not be distinguished from Riley,

as discussed infra Part IV.A.

77.

One might complicate the figure in various ways to reflect, for example, the fact that knock-and-

announce rules create two levels of home entry, warned and unwarned. See supra text accompanying notes

42-43. Buie arguably creates two non-ordinary subcategories of the search within a home. See supra note
53.
One might also chart the subcategories of seizure of persons and property, as discussed suprain note
31, as follows:
SEIZURE TARGET:

LOW

ORDINARY

HIGH

PERSONS

Stop (Terry)

Arrest

Deadly Force (Garner)

PROPERTY

Temporary Detention
(Place)

Full Seizure
(Place)

78.

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).

None?
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GPS device placed on his automobile, would constitute a search only if the
duration were sufficiently long.79 This reasoning was intended to distinguish
the 1983 decision of United States v. Knotts, in which the Court held that
several hours of locational monitoring (using a transponder or beeper) did not
constitute a search."o As new cell phone technology created a compelling
policy reason in Riley to distinguish Robinson, new tracking technology
created a compelling policy reason in Jones to distinguish Knotts. Under
Justice Alito's reasoning, the locational monitoring itself is, for some time,
not a search and, therefore, entirely free of Fourth Amendment restraint. 1
After some duration-twenty-eight days in Jones-the monitoring becomes
a search and demands the full panoply of Fourth Amendment justificationsa warrant and probable cause.82
Law is full of discontinuities, but this one is striking and unfortunate.
The variable of time is so perfectly continuous that the distinction Justice
Alito creates seems arbitrary. If Time D is the moment dividing non-search
locational monitoring from a search, we lack even the fiction of a qualitative
difference between Time D minus five minutes and Time D plus five minutes.
Another reason for the unseemliness is the difficulty of squaring any
selection with the doctrinal formula "reasonable expectation of privacy." 83
At the very least, if reasonable expectations are supposed to be tied in some
way to actual expectations, it seems unlikely that American expectations
change sharply at any particular moment in the continuum of monitoring
duration.84 But the main difficulty, I contend, is how much depends on the
difference in time. A Terry stop may, by the passage of time, become an
arrest.8 5 But the practical difference for law enforcement is only that police
79. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that locational monitoring for "a very long period"
is a search). The plurality reasoning is significant because it could in the future command a majority; the
other five Justices avoided the issue only by deciding the case on narrower grounds that happened to be
available on the facts. See id. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held that the attachment of the GPS
device was itself a search because it was a physical intrusion upon Jones's property rights in his car. Id
at 948-54 (majority opinion).
80. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983); see Richard H. McAdams, Note, Tying
Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoringand Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REv. 297,
305-10 (1985).
81. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-54.
82. Id. at 948.
83. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The language
defining a search famously originates with Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. UnitedStates,
and is subsequently endorsed by the Court in various opinions. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 33 (2001) ("[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.").
84. See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Strahilevitz, Surveillance Duration Doesn't Affect Privacy
Expectations:An Empirical Test ofthe Mosaic Theory 31 (Univ. Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper, No. 534,
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2629373 (finding that duration does not affect
the expectations of locational privacy for the large majority of survey respondents).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) ("Obviously, if an investigative stop
continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop."); Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (finding that the longer duration of the police encounter with the
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need reasonable suspicion for the former, but probable cause for the latter."
When the timing issue is posed, like in Jones, however, the Court moves from
initially requiring no justification for the monitoring to abruptly requiring
probable cause plus a warrant. In Fourth Amendment terms, the Court goes
from requiring nothing to requiring everything."
Justice Alito's reasoning in Jones would be more persuasive if it
minimized the significance of this strong discontinuity, which it could
manage by recognizing two categories of locational searching and
reinterpreting Knotts. Instead of saying there was no search in Knotts (as the
Court reasoned), one could say that it was a low-intensity locational search;
the type justified merely by reasonable suspicion that Knotts was transporting
contraband, a standard easily met on the facts of the case. By contrast, the
multi-week monitoring in Jones is not low-intensity or cursory, but a
full-fledged locational search requiring a warrant and probable cause.89
Thus, with two types of search, the variable of time would affect only how
demanding the Fourth Amendment requirements are, not whether the Fourth
Amendment applies at all. Although the time spans are presumably different,
it would operate like the time difference between a Terry stop and an arrest,
which defines the line between the requirements of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause.90
Proportional rules are more complex, requiring two doctrinal lines:
(1) the line between no search and a cursory search and (2) the line between
a cursory search and a full search. But the complexity allows for more refined
tradeoffs and lessens the discontinuity by providing a more proportionate
response." If triggering Fourth Amendment protection always requires a
suspect and movement away from the initial scene of encounter characterize an arrest requiring probable

cause); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 253-54 (1973) ("A Terry stop involves a momentary
encounter between officer and suspect, while an in-custody arrest places the two in close proximity for a
much longer period of time."); cf United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (finding that a
90-minute detention of luggage required probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion).
86. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1968).
87. Well, almost everything. But not as much justification as surgery requires.
88. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983).
89. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953-54 (2012).
90. Other cases might benefit from this recharacterization. Arguably, Bondv. UnitedStates is a nontechnological example. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). There, police squeezed and
manipulated soft luggage in the overhead rack of a bus, and the majority held it to be a search requiring a
warrant and probable cause. Id at 336. A dissent by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Scalia, challenged
the claim that the police did anything beyond what members of the public would do when moving someone
else's luggage to make room for their own. Id. at 339-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But there was clear
opportunity to recognize that this kind of tactile manipulation, even if it exceeds what members of the
public do, falls short of an ordinary search involving visual inspection and could, therefore, require the
lesser justification of reasonable suspicion (which was probably present in the case). Id. at 335-39. Again,
however, neither the majority nor the dissent thought it worthwhile to complicate the categories.
91. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 ("[B]y suggesting a rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and
regulation under the [Fourth] Amendment, [the Government's argument] obscures the utility of limitations
upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional regulation."); see
also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE
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warrant and probable cause, the decision to recognize a search is particularly
costly. Effectively, the police must wait until they have cause to arrest a
person before they can monitor his or her public movements beyond the
initial time period.92 If waiting is the only option, then the Court will
withhold placing that burden on law enforcement until the government has
engaged in locational monitoring for an extended duration. By contrast, if a
category of low-intensity searches exists that triggers only the requirement
of reasonable suspicion, then the Court may be willing to go back in time to
impose it, possibly to the very beginning of GPS monitoring.93 Unless the
government is engaged in a locational dragnet (monitoring everyone or a
substantial part of the population), it probably only engages in electronic
monitoring when it has reasonable suspicion; thus, demanding reasonable
suspicion for the briefest locational search imposes minimal costs on the
government (other than to prevent dragnets).
Of course, there is no magic to the number two. In a given context, one
might prefer to have three or more subcategories of search. Indeed, one might
dispense with discontinuous categories entirely and judge each search on its
own merits by some sort of reasonableness balancing. That is essentially
what the Court does when it analyzes a search under the special needs
doctrine.94 But there are obvious advantages to categorical rules-and to
simpler rather than more complex rules-to be weighed against the precise
results that a standard enables.95 The point of this Article is not to identify
the optimal level of complexity for subcategories of Fourth Amendment
searches, but merely to demonstrate the superiority of a more complex rule
than the one the Court articulated in Riley. My main aim with the analysis of
this Part has been to frame the decision in Riley to show one way in which
the decision fits in with the other cases. Now I will turn to the merits of the
scope-limited search of a cell phone, beginning with how to formulate the
rule.

FOURTH AMENDMENT 21-48 (2007) (discussing the proportionality principle); Christopher Slobogin,
Making the Most ofUnited States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation ofMosaic

Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 14 (2012) ("In Jones itself, Justice Alito's distinction
between 'prolonged' and short-term tracking could be seen as an application of the proportionality idea.").
92. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
93. Of course, it is also true that, with two search categories, the Court could require a longer
duration before characterizing the monitoring as a full-fledged search requiring a warrant and probable
cause. Indeed, some Supreme Court Justices might prefer to require only reasonable suspicion for any

duration of a locational search. Therefore, commentators who would disagree with this outcome might
strategically prefer on this issue (and others) that the Court be forced to pick between recognizing a search
and requiring a warrant, or recognizing no search and leaving the matter entirely unregulated, because

they may think it will force the Court to require the warrant earlier in the locational surveillance. My
point is simply that abstracting from these political issues, one-size-fits-all inflexibility is not inevitably,
or even likely, the best approach. If you can draw the lines in the right places, two lines are sometimes
better than one.
94. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
95. See infra Part IV.
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III. DEFINING A SCOPE-LIMITED CELL PHONE SEARCH

In Riley, the United States and California argued for several alternatives
to the warrant requirement for searching a cell phone incident to arrest.96 I

will review the more promising options and identify what I think is the best
scope-limited rule." In the next Part, I will consider the merits of the rule.
As the first alternative, the Government proposed that the Court permit,
by analogy to Gant, "a warrantless search of an arrestee's cell phone
whenever it is reasonable to believe that the phone contains evidence of the
crime of arrest."' By itself, this would place only a minor limitation on when
police could search a cell phone and would place no limit on the scope of the
search. Because the phone contains so much historical information about
one's movements (messages, contacts, etc.), many people who commit a
crime will leave evidence of it on their phone; police will frequently have
reason to expect to find it.99 Chief Justice Roberts goes further, stating, "It
would be a particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law enforcement
officer who could not come up with several reasons to suppose evidence of
just about any crime could be found on a cell phone.""oo As a result, the Gant
rule, by itself, would allow police "unbridled discretion to rummage at
will."'
Chief Justice Roberts exaggerates.' 02 The Gant rule would place some
constraint on police, at least if the Court had demanded not merely that it be
conceivable that the cell phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest, but
that there is a reasonable (i.e., non-trivial) probability that it does. One would
not expect to find in the phone's messages, photos, web searches, or apps
evidence for the traffic offense of not wearing a seat belt. Nor should we
expect to find on the phone evidence for crimes of opportunity, such as
embezzlement, shoplifting, or a sudden bar fight. One might reply that the
phone could contain texts or emails revealing the intent to commit the crime

96. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491-92 (2014).
97. See id. at 2492-93. 1 do not discuss two options the Governments raised. In their brief, the
United States also suggested a rule: the police would always be allowed to examine a cell phone's call log
incident to arrest. See id. During oral arguments, California suggested a rule of analogy and as the Court
put it: "officers could search cell phone data if they could have obtained the same information from a predigital counterpart." Id. at 2493. 1 find these arguments unappealing for the reasons the Court provides.
See id.
98. Id. at 2492.
99. See id ("In the cell phone context ... it is reasonable to expect that incriminating information
will be found on a phone regardless of when the crime occurred.").
100. Id. Chief Justice Roberts also said that Gant is distinguishable because of the unique
circumstances involving a car search. Id. That distinction hardly answers the policy issues that are my
focus.
101. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009)).
102. IfChief Justice Roberts is literally correct, he casts doubt onto Gant itself because it is becoming
increasingly common for cars to have built-in, on-board computers, which can contain extensive locational
information and email.
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or an admission after the fact.'0o But without something more (given that the
crimes require no cooperation of others), the purely speculative possibility is
not a "reason to believe" the evidence exists.'0 Or so the Court could have
declared.
But what about locational data? Perhaps there is always reason to
believe that locational data is evidence of the crime of arrest as long as the
crime was committed in a specific location.o" The officer specifies that he
arrested the defendant for a stated crime committed on a particular road or in
a particular workplace, store, or bar. The phone confirms that the defendant
was present at that road, workplace, store, or bar at the time when the officer
says the crime was committed.
With a little innovation, this result is not too difficult to avoid. The
Court could have stated that the expectation of locational data is itself
insufficient to justify a cell phone search in cases in which there is no reason
to expect location to be disputed. In other words, the anticipated evidence
must have some practical value. When the defendant is arrested for
embezzling from his regular employer, he is not going to defend himself by
saying that he was never present in his place of employment when he
obviously was (or at least there is no reason to believe he will). Thus, the
police cannot justify warrantlessly searching the cell phone incident to arrest
by arguing the cell phone will show the suspect to have regularly visited his
workplace, when his presence at work is not in dispute. When police arrest
the defendant at the scene of the crime-the shop where the theft occurred or
the bar where the fight occurred-there is no expected practical value to the
locational data on the defendant's phone because the police and other
witnesses can testify to his obvious presence. Or, the Court could have so
declared in creating a category of scope-limited searches incident to arrest.' 06
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts is correct to think that the Gant
limitation, by itself, would be quite permissive.' 0 7 To prevent unbridled
rummaging in many cases, we would need a limitation on the scope of the
search: not merely when, but how the police can look through the phone
incident to arrest. The Solicitor General's next argument addressed this
point, claiming that the scope of the search could be limited, as the Court
later described it, "to those areas of the phone where an officer reasonably
believes that information relevant to the crime, the arrestee's identity, or

103. See, e.g., State v. Roden, 321 P.3d 1183, 1184 (Wash. 2014) (discussing a drug deal arranged
through text messaging).
104. See United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1111-15 (9th Cir. 2002).
105. See United States v. Stubblefield, 931 F. Supp. 2d 118, 130 (D.D.C. 2013).
106. Cf Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (holding on the facts of the case that there
was no testimonial content to the act of producing papers in response to a subpoena because "[t]he
existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion"). Personal location is often a foregone
conclusion, so the evidence has no value to the government.
107. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492.
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officer safety will be discovered."' 0 This is the idea of a cursory inspection
or frisk of a phone.00
Various lower courts had embraced this idea and the circumstances of
those cases provide useful illustrations. In one Seventh Circuit case, the
police examined the phone incident to arrest solely to determine the
operational number assigned to the phone, limiting their examination to the
cursory search needed to acquire that information." 0 Judge Posner upheld
the validity of the search precisely because of its triviality, reserving for
"another day" the permissibility of "a more extensive search.""' In a
Massachusetts case, the state's supreme court upheld a phone search limited
to "a simple examination of the recent call list," emphasizing that "no further
intrusion into the telephone's contents occurred."" 2 The Supreme Court of
Georgia upheld a search accessing the specific text messages an undercover
officer had sent the defendant earlier on the day of the arrest, confirming that
she was the person with whom he had been communicating about an
undercover drug transaction." 3 The court noted, "'[A cell phone] search
must be limited as much as is reasonably practicable by the object of the
search.' That will usually mean that an officer may not conduct a 'fishing
expedition' and sift through all of the data stored in the cell phone."" 4
Given that this was a common approach among the lower courts, it is
surprising how briefly, in a long opinion, the Court explains its rejection of
the compromise rule: "This approach would again impose few meaningful
constraints on officers. The proposed categories would sweep in a great deal
of information, and officers would not always be able to discern in advance
what information would be found where."'"s In his concurrence, Justice Alito
also briefly rejected the scope-limited rule, stating:
I do not see a workable alternative. Law enforcement officers need clear
rules regarding searches incident to arrest, and it would take many cases and
many years for the courts to develop more nuanced rules. And during that

108. Id.
109. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
110. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 804 (7th Cir. 2012).
111. Id. at 810.
112. Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d. 210, 215 n.8 ( Mass. 2012).
113. Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924, 925 (Ga. 2012).
114. Id. at 926. ("[The fact that a large amount of information may be in a cell phone has substantial
import as to the scope of the permitted search .... Thus, when 'the object of the search is to discover
certain text messages, for instance, there is no need for the officer to sift through photos or audio files or
Internet browsing history data stored [in] the phone.' Accordingly, reviewing the reasonable scope of the
search will largely be a fact-specific inquiry.") (quoting Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 892 (Ga. App.
2010)).
115. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014).
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time, the nature of the electronic devices that ordinary Americans carry on
their persons would continue to change." 6
These reasons are deeply unsatisfying. Defining and elaborating the
cursory inspection of a cell phone would, no doubt, require judicial time and
effort.
But that is true of many or most judicially created rules." 7
Technological change complicates the project of defining scope-limitations,
but the evolution of technology will challenge Fourth Amendment rules in
any event (as in this case), and the concept of a cursory digital search might
prove useful as that happens.
I find it particularly difficult to take seriously the idea that this rule
would be less workable than other Fourth Amendment rules or the current
doctrine of searches incident to arrest, which borders on the incoherent.
Starting with Robinson, Supreme Court doctrine justifies allowing the search
of tontainers incident to arrest with the risk that the arrestee will access
weapons or tamper with evidence."s But, as Justice Alito observed in his
concurrence, once the officer knows the container does not hold a weapon,
the risks of tampering are fully avoided by having the officer secure the
container without searching it."' Given the rationale, therefore, the officer
should seek a warrant before searching the container-the rule in Riley.1 2 0
Yet, Robinson continues to permit an unlimited and warrantless container
search incident to arrest.'121 Unless, of course, the container is an automobile,
as in Gant, in which Justice Scalia succeeded in introducing a different
idea.1 2 2 Once the arrestee is secure, Gant authorizes searches of the vehicle,
not to prevent access to weapons or evidence tampering, but to further the
investigation by finding evidence of criminality, though limited to evidence
of the crime of arrest.1 23 Justice Scalia would prefer that this doctrine apply
generally to govern searches of non-automobile containers and houses.1 2 4

116. Id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).
117. The same is also true of legislation, though the legislature might be the better institution for
formulating such rules. Justice Alito makes this point in his concurrence, stating that he would reconsider
the constitutionality of warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest if Congress or state legislatures,
after gathering appropriate information, were to "enact legislation that draws reasonable distinctions based
on categories of information or perhaps other variables." Id. Justice Alito seems to advocate what John
Rappaport calls "second-order" regulation, where the Court encourages other branches to operate as the
primary regulators of the police. See John Rappaport, Second-OrderRegulation ofLaw Enforcement, 103
CAL. L. REv. 205, 210-11 (2015). In this Article, I take as given the judicial role in specifying the
constitutionally minimal standards, and that doing so will make it the primary regulator of police when
the legislature is inactive.
118. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
119. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497.
120. See id. at 2495.
121. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
122. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 353 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 343 (majority opinion).
124. See id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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But Gant held its rule to be limited to the context of vehicles, as Riley points
out. 125

Thus, we have three competing doctrines regarding warrantless searches
of containers incident to arrest: (1) the permissibility of a full search
(Robinson), (2) the permissibility of a scope-limited search (Gant), and, now,
(3) the impermissibility of any search absent another warrant exception
(Riley). So understood, the virtue of simplicity would favor placing cell
phones in category two and avoiding the creation of a new category three.
Indeed, as I suggest below, one advantage of defining a scope-limited search
of a cell phone is that the momentum towards this category might, in the
future, have facilitated the transfer of other search objects (namely, papers)
from the Robinson regime of category one to the Gant regime of category
two. In any event, the Court did not have to reject the Governments'
compromise rules in Riley to preserve the questionable simplicity and
coherence of its search-incident doctrine.
The above quotation from Chief Justice Roberts raises the separate
concern that "officers would not always be able to discern in advance what
information would be found where."' 26 That is no doubt true. Clever
criminals may hide or encode information; they might use programs to
scramble the dates of messages and photos. But it is the nature of any cursory
search or seizure that the officer cannot guarantee success. If the police stop
a person based only on reasonable suspicion, but can neither confirm nor
dispel that suspicion, after the passage of some amount of time the Terry stop
must come to an end.' 27 Without probable cause, the police cannot continue
to detain the suspect in a way tantamount to arrest. 2 8 The same is true here.
The police should have some limited time to look in relevant places to find
what evidence they have reason to believe exists. The failure to find it
promptly undermines the reason to believe it is present and eventually
exhausts the time available. At that point, even with a scope-limited
exception, the officer would have to get a warrant.
Finally, from Justice Alito, we receive the familiar trope of needing
"clear rules" for police.' 29 Depending on one's general attitude, it is
frustrating or amusing that Supreme Court opinions trumpet the
simple-rules-the-police-can-understand argument whenever a Justice favors
a bright-line rule over a standard one, but the opinions ignore the point
whenever a Justice adopts or applies one of its open-ended standards. To do
their jobs constitutionally, police must understand the fundamental concepts
of probable cause and reasonable suspicion.' 30 Those are not rules, but are
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492 (majority opinion).
Id
See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing only short, minimally invasive stops).
Id
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).
See supra notes 36, 45, 52, 86 and accompanying text.
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standards based on a totality of circumstances.' 3 ' The doctrines for when the
police have seized a person, when the seizure is an arrest, and when they have
received consent for a search-all fundamental to police work-are also
governed by totality-of-circumstances standards.' 32 If police can understand
these evolving standards, there needs to be a better reason to reject the
proposed standard of a limited cell phone search than the idea that police
require simple rules. 33
This general inconsistency between Fourth Amendment rules and
Fourth Amendment standards arises in Riley itself. Chief Justice Roberts
emphasized that despite the Court's general holding, the police can search a
cell phone incident to arrest (or otherwise presumably) when there is an
exigency.13 4 The Court stated:
In light of the availability of the exigent circumstances exception,
there is no reason to believe that law enforcement officers will not be able
to address some of the more extreme hypotheticals that have been
suggested: a suspect texting an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to
detonate a bomb, or a child abductor who may have information about the
child's location on his cell phone.13 5

131. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369-73 (2003) (regarding probable cause); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213,231-41 (1983) (same); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273-77 (2002)
(regarding reasonable suspicion); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 122-28 (2000) (same); Terry, 392
U.S. at 36-37 (same).
132. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-17 (2013) (reviving further the relevance of
trespass to the Fourth Amendment, which entails open-ended questions of whether the police are engaged
in a licensed or unlicensed use of the property); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109-11 (2006)
(defining consent); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1991); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 685 (1985) ("Admittedly, Terry, Dunaway, Royer, and Place, considered together, may in some
instances create difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto
arrest."); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 227-34 (1973) (defining consent); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-14 (1959)
(defining a seizure of a person).
133. One might reply that the Court favors rules by using them whenever possible, employing
standards only when there is no workable rule. To the contrary, the Court is not so consistent. On
numerous occasions, lower courts have formulated plausible rules about probable cause, seizures, and
consent searches in some recurrent context only to be reversed by the Court, insisting on a totality-ofcircumstances standard. See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013) (rejecting lower court
efforts to define specific rules for when dog sniffs generate probable cause); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33, 39 (1996) (rejecting lower court efforts to define specific rules for when a stopped motorist gives valid
consent); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40 (rejecting lower court rules for determining when an investigatory
tactic is a seizure); Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (same); Sharpe, 470 U.S. at
685-86 (rejecting a per se rule specifying the maximum permissible duration of a Terry stop). The Court
abandoned its own successful efforts to make rules to define probable cause in a recurrent situation. See
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (abandoning Aguilar and Spinelli's rules specifying when anonymous tips can
generate probable cause). Michael Coenen uses these Fourth Amendment cases as central examples in
discussing the odd rule he discerns from Supreme Court precedent: some standards may not be clarified
by rules. See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 699-701 (2014).
134. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (majority opinion).
135. Id.
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Yet no bright-line rule defines the parameters of exigent circumstances;
exigency is judged by a standard of immediate need.' 6
The exigency standard is easy enough to apply to the two textbook
examples the Court offers. For many cases, however, there will be much
uncertainty for police. For example, suppose that twenty-four hours ago a
pair of men committed a felony-robbery, arson, rape--or theft of some
weapons or art. Today, the police arrest one suspect based on probable cause.
Do they have an exigency simply because the other perpetrator is at large? If
the crime is a theft, do they have an exigency because the stolen weapons or
art is still missing? Presumably not. What if the police also see the arrestee
using his phone right before they make contact, perhaps trying to send a text
before the police can take the phone? What if the pair is believed to be serial
offenders, so there might be another crime today, or the police have reason
to think the other suspect could flee the jurisdiction? What if the facts are
like one of the cases in Riley (for example, defendant Wurie), and after the
arrest the phone keeps ringing?' Does it matter if the incoming call is
labeled "Boss" or "Bro"?
These questions are difficult. There is no bright-line rule defining
exigency.138 Yet even when the Court determines that an exigency exists, it
must move to a second question: what kind of cell phone search does the
exigency justify? Does it mean the police can now rummage through all the
contents of the phone? Not at all. Basic doctrine says that if an exigency
justifies the search, the search is limited by the exigency.139 In Hicks, for
example, the police could enter an apartment based on the exigency of a
recent shooting, but could only look in places where the shooter or a weapon
could fit.' 40 In general, the exigency exception limits police to looking in the
places where they might expect to find evidence the contingency makes
relevant.
To illustrate, if the police are looking for a kidnapping victim, and the
victim was taken two days ago, the information they need is in the locational
data of the past two days, and it is likely that the police can also examine
texts or phone calls of the same time period (assuming that kidnapping
usually involves cooperating criminals). Perhaps the exigency also allows
the police to go back some period before the kidnapping occurred, but no rule
defines how far. Defining that time period depends on an open-ended inquiry
using the exigency standard. The exigency exception thus requires the very

136. See id.
137. Id. at 2481.
138. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-95 (1978).
139. See id. (noting in a case involving the search of a murder scene that "a warrantless search must
be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation"' (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 25-26 (1968))); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct.
1849, 1856-58 (2011).
140. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987).
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scope limitation that is supposedly too taxing for the courts to create and too
complicated for the police to follow.
In addition, various judges thought it possible to develop a law of
cursory phone searches. The Governments cited those cases in their briefs.141
A few months after the Riley decision, the Canadian Supreme Court reached
the same issue in Regina v. Fearon.142 That court fashioned a rule permitting
a scope-limited search: Assuming that the arrest is lawful and that the cell
phone search be "truly incidental to the arrest," the court also required the
police to have "a valid law enforcement purpose to conduct the search" and
that "[t]he nature and the extent of the search [be] tailored to the purpose of
the search."l 43 The court was serious enough about the scope limitation that
it added a process requirement that "[t]he police take detailed notes of what
they have examined on the device and how it was searched."'" In context,
it appears that these notes need to be nearly contemporaneous with the
search.1 45 The notes are an independent requirement; if the police do not take
notes, they cannot meet their burden of proving the search to be within the
permitted scope.1 46 In Fearon, the police, not yet informed of this rule, had
not taken notes, and so the court held the cell phone search to be unlawfulthough in the end, it did not exclude the evidence.1 47
Fearon offers a plausible definition for a cursory search of a cell
phone.1 48 One might disagree with how the court limited the ends of the
search merely to any objectively "valid law enforcement purpose"-which
was similar to the Solicitor General's second proposal in Riley.' 49 To use the
141. Brief for The United States at IV-VI, United States v. Wurie, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13212), 2014 WL 828012; Brief for Respondent at IV-VIII, Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (No. 13-132), 2014 WL
1348466.
142. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 661 (Can.).
143. Id.
144. Id
145. Id. at 660-61.
146. Id. at 661.
147. Id. at 662-63. The court offered this summary of its holding:
[P]olice officers will not be justified in searching a cell phone or similar device incidental to
every arrest. Rather, such a search will comply with [Canadian constitutional law] where:
(1) The arrest was lawful;
(2) The search is truly incidental to the arrest in that the police have a reason based on a valid
law enforcement purpose to conduct the search, and that reason is objectively reasonable. The
valid law enforcement purposes in this context are:

(a) Protecting the police, the accused, or the public
(b) Preserving evidence; or
(c) Discovering evidence, including locating additional suspects, in situations in
which the investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability
to promptly search the cell phone incident to arrest;
(3) The nature and the extent of the search are tailored to the purpose of the search; and
(4) The police take detailed notes of what they have examined on the device and how it was
searched.
Id at 661.
148. Id. at 661.
149.

See id.; supranote 108 and accompanying text.
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narrower limitation of Gant would be better: the goal of securing evidence of
the crime of arrest.s 0 The Fearon court properly insisted on the means being
narrowly tailored to achieve the legitimate ends, limiting the nature and
extent of the search, including the issue of time."' Worth considering is the
requirement that police take notes indicating the reasons for and the scope of
their search, which obviously facilitates judicial review of the scope
limitations, but this requirement has no American precedent as far as I can
determine.
Thus, the threshold for the warrantless search that I propose requires the
police to have a reason to believe the cell phone contains useful evidence of
the crime of arrest; the scope is a brief examination of the part of the phone
that the police reasonably believe contains such evidence. Courts should
limit the police to examining the phone in the field promptly after the arrest,
not in the police crime lab. If the crime is recent, the police should ordinarily
limit searches to a recent time period. In the normal case, if the perpetrator
committed the crime in the past few hours or days, the police are fishing if
they go back a month or a year. Thus, a court can prevent general rummaging
by identifying where rummaging actually exists and then disallowing it. The
task of defining scope limitations would require some common law
refinement of the standard over time, but it could be done.
To summarize, I propose that the Court should have permitted police to
conduct a brief field search of a cell phone, without a warrant, when it is
incident to a valid arrest, when there is reason to believe that the phone
contains useful evidence of the crime of arrest, and when the police limit their
search to the places where such evidence might realistically be found. With
that definition in mind, I now turn to the case for granting the police the
power of a low-intensity search of a cell phone incident to arrest.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF A SCOPE-LIMITED CELL PHONE SEARCH

I offer four arguments for the scope-limited rule I have defined. The
starting point is a discussion of the normative basis for Figure 1.152 Is there
any good reason for varying the number of search categories with the target
of the search? I argue there is such a reason and that it points toward a more
nuanced rule for cell phones. Second, I evaluate the eternal balance between
law enforcement and the values of the Fourth Amendment, contending that it
favors a compromise rule.' 53 Third, I consider how Riley produces an
150. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350-51 (2009); see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
151. Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at 657-58.
152. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
153. See infra Part IV.B. Regarding the general need to balance, see, for example, Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) ("Where [the historical] inquiry yields no answer, we must
evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand,
the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.").
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unfortunate doctrinal anomaly-the differential treatment of digital and
analogue papers-that the scope-limited search would narrow.154 Finally, I
predict that Riley may produce an unintended negative consequence-the
loosening of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.15

A. Higher Stakes Justify Scope-Limited Rules
Is there a normative theory that can explain Figure 1? Why should the
law recognize more categories of a search in some contexts than in others?
The answer that I propose is that the complexity of the rule should depend on
the stakes involved for privacy and law enforcement. When the stakes for
both are low, the optimal rule is simple because the administrative costs of a
complex rule are not likely to be worth the stakes. When the stakes are high
on one side and low on the other, the optimal rule is still likely to be simple
and in favor of whichever side has the higher stakes. For example, if the
privacy stakes of a category of search are high and the law enforcement stakes
are low, we should expect a simple rule offering strong protections against
searches. The final case of interest is when the stakes are high on both
sides-privacy and law enforcement. In this scenario, the optimal rule is
likely more complex.`6
We might guess that the stakes are particularly high for searches of
persons and homes, two areas in which the Court recognizes a distinction
The
between ordinary searches and some kind of low-intensity search.'
when
it
involves
one's
bodily
privacy or liberty interest is particularly high
integrity; the stakes are especially high when it involves the home-the
property one expects to serve as a refuge-a place of relative isolation from
the world. At the same time, the law enforcement stakes were high in both
Terry and Buie because the purpose of the frisk (of the person or house) was
to identify immediate threats to the safety of the police officer. The high
privacy stakes push against a simple rule requiring no additional justification
for the frisk; the high law enforcement stakes push against a simple rule
requiring probable cause and a warrant. The compromise rule-a lesser form
of search (frisk) sustained by a lesser level of justification (reasonable
suspicion)-is more complicated and costly, but justified by the costs of the
simple rule.'
154.
155.

See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.D.

156.

See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557

(1992); Francesco Parisi, Rules Versus Standards,in ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. CHOICE 510, 510-15 (Charles
K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004).
157. See discussionsupra Part fl; supranote 64 and accompanying text.
158. On this analysis, the result in Michigan v. Long arises from the fact that the law enforcement
stakes are high (officer safety), while the privacy stakes are not so high (a brief search for weapons in the
subset of the passenger area of a car in which the suspect might grab a weapon). See Michigan v. Long,
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The search of property in an Arizona v. Hicks situation is more difficult
to classify. Given that the police are already lawfully inside the apartment,
the privacy interests are limited to their inspection of personal property,
which for things that are not papers, are generally less serious than the interest
involved in searching one's body or home. The law enforcement interest is
also plausibly less. First, there is no issue of police safety. Second, the main
use of a cursory inspection of appliances would be, as in Hicks, to find the
serial number to identify if the goods were stolen.159 Unless the appliances
were stolen in the course of a deadly robbery, the law enforcement interest in
detecting theft is moderate-not at all trivial, but not of the highest
importance. Thus, the case for creating a scope-limited rule was weaker than
in Terry or Buie.' None of this is to say that Hicks came out the right way;
I still believe the dissent had the stronger argument. 16 ' The case, however, is
a close one and the analysis of stakes shows that one could justify the
distinction from Terry and Buie.' 62
Where do cell phones fit in this analysis? A cell phone is a container
for an immense number of digital papers-documents of one's messages,
images, locations, etc. As Riley explains, the privacy stakes in these digital
papers are extremely high-much higher than for an appliance serial
number.' What about the law enforcement interests? On the rule/standard
theory I am offering, the Court's decision-a simple rule strongly protecting
Fourth Amendment rights by requiring a warrant-would make sense if the
law enforcement interests were low. Yet I don't think they are. First, there
is the possibility that an arrestee recently communicated on the phone with
criminal confederates who might be on their way to the scene, posing a threat
to the officer." Second, the very fact that there is pervasive private
information on one's cell phone means that when the owner is actually guilty
463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983).
159. See supra text accompanying note 68.
160. Although I mention the severity of crime as being relevant for picking the doctrine, I assume
that the scope-limited rule I advocate would not be applied differentially depending on the seriousness of
the crime. I instead follow the conventional assumption that the Fourth Amendment doctrine is a
transsubstantive rule. See Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment:

Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2011) (exchanging normative
views on the transsubstantive basis of Fourth Amendment doctrine); Christopher Slobogin, Why Crime
Severity Analysis Is Not Reasonable, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1 (2012); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing
After the Terror, Ill YALE L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002) ("[M]ost constitutional limits on policing are
transsubstantive-they apply equally to suspected drug dealers and suspected terrorists.").
161. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
162. See id. One might justify the Hicks outcome on other grounds, while still rejecting the logic of
"[a] search is a search." Id. When police safety is not at issue, perhaps cursory searches incident to arrest
or of items in plain view should always be limited by a connection to the crime of arrest or the exigency
justifying the home entry that puts the item in plain view (i.e., whatever justifies the initial warrantless
search or seizure), as in Gant. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343-44 (2009). In Hicks, the police
search of the stereo was unrelated to the exigent circumstances justifying entry into the apartment. Hicks,
480 U.S. at 325. 1 thank Chris Slobogin for this point.
163. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
164. See id.
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of the crime of arrest, it is likely to contain highly probative evidence of that
crime, and this relationship is likely to hold for very serious crimes.1 65 Thus,
the stakes are high on both sides. The search of a cell phone is therefore more
like Terry and Buie.'66 High stakes on both sides make it easier to justify a
more complex rule-one that distinguishes ordinary searches from cursory
searches and requires more justification for the former than the latter.
The point about optimal rule complexity is fairly abstract. Now let us
move to a more pragmatic balancing of costs and benefits.
B. BalancingPrivacy and Law Enforcement
When the issue turns on balancing, as it often does, the frustrating reality
of Fourth Amendment law is that we usually have nothing but our intuitions.
Whether the constitutional value at issue is defined as privacy (as I will
assume), autonomy, property, dignity, security, or something else, we have
no good way of measuring the loss of that value when the rule permits greater
government intrusion. There are empirical studies of privacy expectations,
which are a valuable start, but we lack a good way of assigning a weight to a
loss of any particular kind of privacy, and we are in even worse shape with
many other values.'
On the other side, we have the law enforcement
interest. The problem here seems more tractable; in principle, criminologists
could quantify the crime reduction (or increased clearance rate or cost
savings) attributable to a particular police practice. Yet, social science still
debates the value of more basic things, like whether adding police decreases
crime, so it is not surprising that there is no empirical consensus on the effect
of specific police tactics.1 6 8 When the job is balancing, it would be beneficial
if the evidence permitted a serious cost-benefit analysis, but for now courts
and legal commentators can only offer intuition.
So here is my intuition, with the brevity it deserves: the privacy losses
of cursory cell phone searches are outweighed by the law enforcement gains.
First, as Riley describes, much of the privacy concern about cell phones arises
from what could be reconstructed about a person if the police are allowed to
excavate the entire phone, piecing together locational information, contacts,
messages, photos, search history, etc.' 6 1 That sort of comprehensive search
and mosaic reconstruction is, in almost all cases, beyond the capability of an
officer in the field limited by time and the places to be searched (related to
165.

See Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924, 926 (Ga. 2012).

166.

See supra text accompanying note 150.

167.

Regarding privacy empiricism, see Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable

Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at

&

"UnderstandingsRecognized and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 728 (1993); Kugler
Strahilevitz, supra note 84, at 1.

168. See, e.g., Ben Vollaard & Joseph Hamed, Why the PoliceHave an Effect on Violent Crime After
All: Evidencefrom the British Crime Survey, 55 J.L. & ECON. 901, 902 (2012).
169. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
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the crime of arrest).' 7 0 Undoubtedly, an officer may come across a recent
message or photo that is, by itself, embarrassing and revealing of intimate
information. But, as I emphasize in Part IV.C, that risk exists in the world of
analogue searches incident to arrest, which are still governed by Robinson.
What is special about cell phones is mostly not at issue in a cursory field
search.
Second, police work depends on persistent timeliness-a promptness in
identifying and following up on leads. When a person is arrested, there may
be a limited time to find coconspirators or witnesses who will, upon learning
of the arrest, flee or hide. There may be limited time to find evidence that
may be moved or destroyed and to uncover plans for future crimes. In
Fearon, when the police arrested one robber, but the other robber, the stolen
money, and the firearm were still missing, the Canadian Supreme Court
thought that good police work involved the immediate search of the phone."'
The same was true of the other lower court cases discussed previously: they
endorsed the police immediately following up on leads. 72
Against my argument, there are two responses. The first is Chief Justice
Roberts's observation about the existence of the exigent circumstance
exception."' Perhaps the exception will desirably allow a warrantless search
in cases like Fearon, but not allow warrantless searches in cases without an
exigency.
My rejoinder is that, unless the exigency doctrine changes (for the
worse, as I argue in Part IV.D), it only solves a small part of the problem. An
exigency is based on a specific threat of evidence destruction, flight, or
something else.' 74 In Fearon, the police did not have any specific evidence
that the particular co-felon involved had been alerted of the arrest, was in the
process of fleeing, or that the particular money or gun was about to be moved,
hidden, or destroyed.175 Instead, the police had, as they frequently would, a
general concern that co-felons will be tipped off before the police could get
to them, giving them time to put themselves and the evidence beyond the
reach of the police."' Similarly, the fact that the arrestee's phone rings after
170. See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A ShatteredLooking Glass: The Pitfalls andPotential
of the Mosaic Theory ofFourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 410-11 (2013); Stephen
E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance after United States v. Jones: An
Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 825 (2013); Orin S. Kerr,
The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
171. R. v. Fearon, [20141 3 S.C.R. 621, 627 (Can.).
172. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 804 (7th Cir. 2012); Hawkins v. State, 723
S.E.2d 924, 925 (Ga. 2012) (holding that there is an exception to the warrant requirement when it is
reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest will be found on the phone); see also
Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210, 215-16 (Mass. 2012) (upholding the search of a cell phone
when police had probable cause to believe that the cell phone contained evidence of the crime of arrest).
173. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
174. See infra note 177.
175. Fearon,3 S.C.R. at 627.
176. Id.
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the arrest is not convincing evidence of exigency, but answering the call or
promptly accessing the phone to determine its origin seems like a useful
police practice with the potential to create new leads. 7 It is productive, as a
matter of routine police work, to discover the names and locations of
co-felons as quickly as possible, which in some cases a cursory search will
uniquely achieve.
I do not know how often one of these hidden exigency scenarios arises,
but consider a list of the possibilities. Over the course of all arrests, there
will be a number of cases in which, despite the absence of specific grounds
for suspicion, the arrestee has recently used the cell phone to send to, or
receive from, co-felons a message regarding the crime.1 7 8 The message might
reveal ongoing efforts to flee or hide evidence or the confederates'
expectation of an immediate text from the arrestee confirming that all is well,
the absence of which will trigger such efforts. 7 9 in some cases, the criminal
confederates will not be tipped off, but the arrestee's phone will have
unknown, time-sensitive information about their temporary location or plans
for an imminent new crime, one that police can thwart only if they search the
phone immediately. 80 When there is reason to believe the phone contains
useful evidence of the crime of arrest, particularly when there are
unaccounted for co-felons, weapons, or evidence, the best routine practice
upon securing the arrestee may be to promptly check the arrestee's phone for
very recent messages to see if any of these scenarios play out. The
scope-limited search defined above will permit enough searching to discover
these types of evidence with some high frequency.'"' The exigent circumstances, by contrast, permit the warrantless search only when police already
have specific evidence that one of these scenarios is present.182
The second response to my law enforcement point is that the police can
routinely search the phone incident to arrest if they routinely get a warrant,
which can become standard practice for all arrests. With regard to telephonic

177. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. This scenario is similar to the facts of Wurie's case in Riley. In
Wurie, the arrestee's phone repeatedly received an incoming call from a source labeled as "my house." Id.
at 2481. In the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the dissenting judge argued that these facts created an
exigency justifying the search of the phone. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2013)
(Howard, J., dissenting). Yet, the claim of exigency here is very weak and supports my claim in Part IV.D
that the effect of Riley weakens the standards for exigency. If there were an exigency here, a crucial fact
in support would be that the incoming call was labeled (readable on the outside of the phone) "my house."
See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492-93. Even the dissenter would appear to concede that there would be no
exigency for calls not so labeled, however, there would be investigative value to answering any incoming
call on the arrestee's phone received shortly after arrest. See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 14-22.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 110-14.
179. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2012) ("The arrested suspect
might have prearranged with coconspirators to call them periodically and if they didn't hear from him on
schedule to take that as a warning that he had been seized, and to scatter.").
180. See infra Part IV.C-D.
181. See supra Part III.
182. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
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warrants, the time delay need not be particularly long.' This is an important
point and probably the best argument for Riley's rejection of a compromise
rule. Consider a few replies.
There is a trade off between a serious warrant process, which will
impede the routine searches I advocate, and a non-serious warrant process,
which is a perfunctory and meaningless ritual. First, if the warrant
requirement involves serious consideration of probable cause to believe the
particular phone contains evidence of a crime, then it could easily prevent
phone searches from being routine. Chief Justice Roberts says that it would
take an unimaginative officer who could not think of several types of
evidence for the crime of arrest that might be on the phone, but that does not
have to mean that it is easy to demonstrate probablecause to believe that the
phone contains such evidence.' 84 If the warrant process is serious, the police
will frequently fail to justify even the most limited peek into the phone.
When there is probable cause, the warrant requirement necessitates
some delay. The Riley briefs and opinion extensively discussed the worst
case scenario in which delay makes the search impossible, for one of two
reasons: (1) the phone, after a short time of disuse, becomes inaccessible
without a password the arrestee will not share; and (2) the phone may be
remotely wiped.'
The Court was ultimately not concerned about these
matters given its assessment of the technologies, especially the use of
Faraday bags,' but (at the Symposium) Mary Leary offered some cause for
pessimism about these solutions.'8 7 Technology is constantly changing, thus,
it is difficult to be certain that the delay of a warrant will not sometimes put
the contents of a phone beyond reach of the police.'
A cursory but
immediate field search may turn out to be a unique moment of access.
Even if there is a warrant and the police gain access to the phone, there
is delay. While new technology makes it faster to get warrants, it also
accelerates the ability of criminals to coordinate their activities and
communicate the need to destroy evidence or flee. It is not clear that the
greater speed in warrants fully compensates for the greater quickness in
criminal efforts at concealment. One possibility is that co-felons have an
agreement to send a certain message periodically to indicate that all is well,
in which case the arrest will automatically notify the co-felons whenever the
next message is due and the arrestee does not send it. 8 9
And even if the information remains perfectly accessible, in the
aggregate, there are costs to the delay. As explained above, when the
183. See id.
184. See id. at 2492-93.
185. Id. at 2486.
186. Id. at 2486-87.
187. Mary Graw Leary, The Supreme DigitalDivide, 48 TEX. TECH L. REv. 65 (2015).
188. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486-91 (discussing several ways a phone's contents can become out of
reach for police).
189. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2012).
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'

evidence on the phone is time-sensitive, but the police do not know there is
an exigency, even brief delay can cause the loss of suspects and evidence.
Now consider a different scenario. Magistrates may wind up granting
the request for a warrant as a matter of course. If police routinely request
warrants from the field whenever they arrest someone possessing a phone,
millions of new requests will be issued each year across the United States.' 90
The pressure of those new warrant requests may produce an assembly-line
production of warrants. Many magistrates may decide categorically that,
unless it is clear that the arrestee is innocent or that a single person committed
the crime of arrest, there is always probable cause to search the arrestee's
phone, given the likelihood of finding evidence pointing to confederates. 19
But then there is little in the way of individualized consideration of the cause
for searching the phone, and it is not clear what the warrant requirement
accomplishes.
Indeed, note the perverse incentive that may arise from requiring a
warrant for even the most cursory search. If, to check for unknown
exigencies, police will routinely request and magistrates will routinely grant
warrants to search the phone of arrestees, then Riley will produce deeper
privacy invasions compared to the proposed rule above. With a scope-limited
exception, the police will routinely conduct a cursory search in the field and
frequently, finding nothing of interest, have no reason to seek a warrant. This
seems likely because approximately 95% of felony convictions come from a
guilty plea.' 9 2 After a scope-limited search, the police and prosecutor would
be able to retain the phone and maintain the option of getting a warrant if the
defendant threatens to go to trial. But a busy police force and prosecutor's
office have better things to do than to ask for a warrant for the phones of
defendants already pleading guilty after they have already completed a
cursory search and found nothing. If the price of taking the smallest peek
inside the phone is a warrant, however, more police officers will seek
warrants, and those warrants will allow and produce more general
rummaging. True, the warrants may themselves limit the scope of the search,
but because the information could be hidden anywhere, as Chief Justice
Roberts asserts, and the time for searching is not limited, the warrant-based

190.

See FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012

(2013),
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/personsarrested/persons-arrested/arrestmain.pdf. There were more than 12.1 million arrests in the United States
in 2012. Id.
191. What makes this plausible is that magistrates are presumably used to the old rule that the police
can search any container found on the arrestee, and so might be very receptive to weak claims of exigency
raised after police find incriminating evidence during what they represent to be a quick and cursory search
of the phone. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (establishing a lenient standard for
searches following custodial arrests); see also Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 803 (discussing the interplay
between the search of a phone and evidence an accomplice might destroy).
192. See FAQ Detail, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty-qa&iid-405 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2015).
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search will be far more intrusive than the cursory field search.' This is all
the more true if the warrant allows the police to make a complete copy of the
phone.
In sum, my intuition is on the side of many lower courts and the
Canadian Supreme Court: the balancing favors allowing a warrantless but
cursory search of cell phones incident to arrest.1 94
C. The Gap Between Digital and "Analogue" Searches
Consider next the doctrinal anomaly Riley creates. Justice Alito
explains in his concurrence that "[i]t has long been accepted that written
items found on the person of an arrestee may be examined and used at
trial."l 95 He cites a long string of cases involving the warrantless search
incident to arrest of a diary, a ledger, bills, an address book, a notebook, a
wallet, meeting minutes, a circular, advertising matter, a checkbook, a set of
"memoranda containing various names and addresses," and other papers.'"
These cases follow Robinson, which allows warrantless searches of
non-digital containers found on the person of the arrestee: wallets, purses,
backpacks, etc.' 9 As Alito argues, it would be easy enough to secure papers
found on a person or in their containers until a warrant is obtained.' 9 But the
analogue rule is that all the papers may be thoroughly examined incident to
arrest without a warrant.1 99 Riley's new digital rule is quite different.20 0
One could explain this anomaly by the expedience of rulemaking. Rules
are always overinclusive and underinclusive. So if it is easy to distinguish
between analogue and digital material, and if the former, on average, contains
far less private information than the latter, then a different rule for each could
make sense. Yet, it is also not so difficult to distinguish papers (all the above
examples Justice Alito references) from effects (for example, weapons,
drugs, cash, stolen goods).2 0' So once the Riley Court decided to complicate
the search incident rule for containers, a better distinction than analogue
versus digital might be effects versus papers.202 It would be pragmatically
193. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489-91.
194. See R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 627 (Can.).
195. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring).
196. Id. at n.2.
197. Id.
198. See id at 2496-97.
199. See id. at 2493-94 (majority opinion).
200. See id. at 2493.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
202. The Supreme Court once recognized a distinction in papers and effects. See Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Others have described the long history by which Boyd was abandoned and
have argued for some limited return to the distinction. See Donald A. Dripps, 'DearestProperty': Digital
Evidence and the History ofPrivate 'Papers"as Special Objects ofSearch and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2013); Eric Schnapper, UnreasonableSearches and Seizures ofPapers, 71 VA. L.

REv. 869, 881 (1985).
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better for purposes of balancing, and the distinction would be grounded more
directly in the text of the Fourth Amendment.20 3 Perhaps we will see
Robinson's application to analogue papers questioned along these lines in
future cases, leading to a warrant requirement for all searches of papers
incident to arrest. 2 04

In any event, the anomaly Riley creates is a stark shift in the rules for
what are sometimes very similar materials.
Imagine that police
surreptitiously observe a suspect buy an extra cell phone, confirm with the
vendor that it was a new account (therefore not downloading from the cloud
any information associated with an existing account), and arrest him thirty
minutes later after he appears to use the phone in a criminal transaction. The
fact that the police know the phone contains almost no information does not
appear to affect the bright-line rule of Riley. 205 They cannot search the phone
without a warrant based on probable cause that the phone contains evidence
of a crime. But if the police surveil a suspect and wait for him to have his
300,000 word paper diary in his possession, it appears that they can carefully
read it in its entirety incident to his lawful arrest, without any reason to
believe it contains evidence of a crime. The rule is not tightly tailored to the
amount of privacy the police violate or expect to violate. It is instead tied to
the form in which the private information is stored, which is only a proxy for
the amount of private information at stake.
A rule permitting a warrantless, scope-limited search of a cell phone
would not eliminate the anomaly, but would narrow it considerably. The
compromise of a scope-limited search of digital containers would align that
category closer to the search of analogue papers, which are subject to an
unlimited search incident to arrest. Instead of all or nothing, as it now stands,
the disparity would be all or some.
The scope-limited approach might even lead to the elimination of the
anomaly entirely. If we had a scope-limited rule, courts might see the virtue
in applying it, not merely to cell phones and other digital devices, but also to
all papers, digital or analogue. Thus, the cell phone and the diary would be
subject only to a cursory search incident to arrest. As with the cell phone,
after a valid arrest, the police in the field could quickly page through a
notebook to identify and check recent entries, if police have reason to believe
the entries contain evidence of the crime of arrest, but would require a
warrant for a more comprehensive search. The Robinson rule allowing
automatic searches of containers would remain in place for personal effects
(i.e., briefcases, purses, backpacks, etc.).2 06

203. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers
and effects . . .. ")
204. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
205. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
206. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.
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D. Dilution of the Exigent CircumstancesException
I close with a brief prediction: The refusal to recognize a scope-limited
search will put pressure on lower courts to expand the exigent circumstances
exception. As in Fearon, the police will frequently arrest individuals for a
crime committed with reason to believe that co-felons remain at large; they
will frequently conduct a search incident to arrest of the arrestee and of the
effects in his or her possession, and fail to find instrumentalities or proceeds
of the crime.207 The police will then use the missing suspects and evidence
to claim exigency. The claims should fail because the mere existence of an
undiscovered co-felon or criminal proceeds does not provide probable cause
to believe that there is, on the arrestee's phone, evidence of the identity or
location of co-felons, weapons, or evidence, much less probable cause that
the co-felon is currently fleeing or concealing evidence. But the courts will
see some cases in which hindsight proved the police officers to be right and
experience increased pressure to uphold the validity of the warrantless search
on an exigency theory. The long-term effect will be to expand the category
of exigency.
As an example, consider the decision below in Wurie, the companion
case to Riley.20 8 The police arrested Wurie after observing him make an
apparent drug sale from a car.2 09 Immediately after the arrest, Wurie's phone
received repeated calls from a source labeled on the external screen as "my
house."210 After a few minutes, police opened the phone and determined the
number associated with "my house."211 They further determined that it was
a land line and went to the associated apartment.212 Through the first floor
apartment window, police saw a woman they said matched a photo that
served as the cell phone's wallpaper, so they immediately entered the
apartment to "freeze" it while waiting to secure a search warrant.2 13 The
Tenth Circuit panel found a Fourth Amendment violation and reversed. 2 14
Judge Howard dissented and one ground he gave for upholding the search
was exigency: "the risk that others might have destroyed evidence after
Wurie did not answer his phone. . . . His failure to answer [repeated] phone
calls could have alerted Wurie's confederates to his arrest, prompting them
to destroy further evidence of his crimes. "215
The majority responded that this concern over evidence destruction is
"mere speculation [and that] it is also a possibility present in almost every
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 627 (Can.).
United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id at 1-2.
Id at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id at 14.
Id. at 17 (Howard, J., dissenting).
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instance of a custodial arrest." 2 16 Judge Howard replied, "On the contrary,
the justification is based on the specific facts of this case. The fact that 'my
house' repeatedly called Wurie's cell phone provided an objective basis for
enhanced concern that evidence might be destroyed and thus gave the police
a valid reason to inspect the phone." 2 17
The panel majority correctly concluded that the argument for exigency
involves two levels of speculation.2 18 The first is that there are drugs in the
apartment of a person suspected of selling drugs, as if the bare fact of
arresting a suspected drug dealer in public would always justify a warrant to
search the arrestee's home. 21 9 To the contrary, a seller might avoid the risk
of keeping drugs in his home, or he might just be out of inventory. The
second level of speculation is that the person dialing the suspect's cell phone
from the suspect's home will (a) interpret the failure to answer (for less than
an hour) as evidence of the individual's arrest and (b) be in a position to take
the initiative to move or destroy drugs stored in the home (assuming that
person knows the location of the drugs). 22 0 These are nothing more than mere
possibilities. Yet not only did the police search the phone, with the additional
fact that they spotted the woman pictured in the cell phone wallpaper inside
the apartment, the police also executed a warrantless entry into the home (to
secure it pending a search warrant). 2 21 Admittedly, two judges on the panel
rejected the exigency argument, but one federal appellate judge found it
bo
222
By blocking other paths, Riley's holding will make the
convincing.
exigency argument more alluring.
Time will tell whether my prediction is accurate. At the extreme, courts
might expand their recognition of exigency to the point that the same searches
a scope-limited search doctrine would authorize would be permitted under a
different name. That might make it appear unimportant that the Court
rejected the idea of a scope-limited search. The problem is that the
broadening of exigent circumstances will have effects beyond the search of
cell phones incident to arrest. The search-incident-exigency cases can be
cited as precedent for home-entry-exigency cases, as in Wurie, or other
searches ordinarily requiring a warrant. 223 The same exigency that justifies a
216. Id. at 11 n.l I (majority opinion).
217. Id. at 17 (Howard, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 11 (majority opinion). To be clear, my argument in Part IV.B for a scope-limited search
is based in part on the idea that speculation such as Judge Howard's will sometimes prove true, making
the category of searches productive. But, as I explain, it would be better to authorize the scope-limited
search as a direct incident to all arrests than to get to the same result by watering down the meaning of
exigency.

219. See id. at 2, 11 n.11.
220. Id.atIln.11.
221. Id at 2.
222. See generally id (rejecting the exigency argument). But see id at 14 (Howard, J., dissenting)
(arguing for exigency).
223. See id at 20-22 (Howard, J., dissenting) (discussing the exceptions to the Court's holding that
cell phone searches require a warrant).
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peek inside the suspect's cell phone can frequently justify a peek inside the
suspect's house. Whatever loosening occurs in the cell phone context will
not remain limited to that domain-an undesirable, unintended consequence,
and a final reason that it would have been better to address the problem with
the right tool, a scope-limited search.
V. CONCLUSION

Riley has been immediately recognized as an important case for the
proposition that Fourth Amendment rules and precedents of nontechnological settings may not apply to analogous technological settings. For that
reason, it deserves praise. Less obviously, however, the case is important in
a second way, for its rejection of a cursory, scope-limited search of digital
papers incident to arrest. Instead of requiring a warrant for any cell phone
search incident to arrest, the Court could have permitted the police to conduct
a brief field search of a cell phone incident to arrest, without a warrant, when
there is reason to believe that the phone contains useful evidence of the crime
of arrest, and when the police limit their search to the places where such
evidence might realistically be found (perhaps all as confirmed by
contemporaneous police notes of the search). Some Fourth Amendment rules
distinguish between a full-fledged search and a cursory search, but here the
Court added to the precedent (notably Hicks) rejecting this distinction when
the object of the search is personal property other than an automobile.
Riley is a notable case for the bedrock issue of how many types of
searches exist in the Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear
that the Court made the right decision, given that many lower courts (and the
Canadian Supreme Court) did recognize a scope-limited search incident to
arrest, and Riley offers only the most superficial analysis of its decision to
reject that approach. The effects of this second aspect of Riley are more
negative than positive, but will ultimately depend on how seriously
magistrates review warrant applications for cell phone searches and how
much they relax the requirements of exigency in cases in which the police
forgo a warrant.

